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Kinds of Pragmatism
Albert Borgmann
University of Montana
It is hard to appreciate now what a liberating and invigorating force John Dewey's philosophy must have been. He did
away  with  imperious  dichotomies  and  absolutes,  reconnected  philosophy  with  the  sciences,  confronted  technological
revolutions, attended to the perils and hopes of ordinary people, and pioneered methods that were dedicated to openness,
concreteness, and flexibility.
Larry Hickman, in Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture (2001) and elsewhere, has vigorously and untiringly
brought Dewey's achievements to his readers' attention, and he has made a persuasive case for the claim that Dewey is the
great predecessor of the kind of work that is grouped around the Society for Philosophy and Technology. Hickman, moreover,
has in his own work exhibited many of the Deweyan virtues and has articulated sharply a philosophy of technology that in
Dewey's work is distributed among the numerous concerns Dewey had. Hickman in fact has argued plausibly that the core and
coherence of Dewey's writings can be spelled out as a philosophy of technology.
Dewey has  had  no  direct  influence  on  my thinking  about  technology,  and  yet  I  too  would  acknowledge  him as  a
forerunner.  In  Human  Nature  and  Conduct  (1988  [1922],  pp.  86-87,  185-188),  his  brilliant  sketches  of  how  industrial
technology has blighted work and the relation of production to consumption have captured much of what has distressed me
about technology. His unflagging attention to technology in The Public and Its Problems (1954 [1927], pp. 30, 44, 98, 108,
114, 116, 129, 141, 144, 165, 217) prefigures my conviction that modern technology is the paradigmatic force in contemporary
society and culture. Just as important, Dewey's vision of the illuminating and centering force of the arts in Human Nature
(1988, pp. 110-113) and in the last chapter of Art and Experience (1958 [1934], pp. 326-349) reveal some of the focal points
for what I take to be a constructive reform of technology.
Finally those of us who have learned from Martin Heidegger and are sometimes tagged with his name should confess to
guru envy. Dewey was a thoroughly fair and decent man who on almost any issue said the reasonable and honorable thing. He
never put on airs and conducted himself with exemplary good judgment in his public and political engagements. Heidegger, to
the contrary, though he had his genuinely convivial and congenial sides, failed in the most distressing ways the moral tests that
destiny sent his way, and he had an overweening notion of the office of philosophy and of himself as a thinker. His writings are
fertile hunting grounds for those who are looking for wrong-headed and indefensible dicta.
Why then is it that Heidegger has left so much stronger an impression on philosophers than Dewey has? If you consult the
Internet  by  way of  a  general  search  engine,  you find,  as  you  would expect,  that  Dewey is  much more  prominent  than
Heidegger in the public awareness of this country. But, if you checked the Philosopher's Index on 22 July 2002 about the last
thirty years (1972-2001), you found 1,321 references to Dewey and 4,457 for Heidegger.
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How is this to be explained? There might well be dubious reasons why philosophers are drawn to Heidegger. His difficult
and his obscure writings enable lesser minds to claim membership in an elite that is elevated above the rationalism and logic
chopping of mainstream philosophers. But this cannot be the whole explanation. Jacques Derrida obliges obscurantism even
more than Heidegger, and there are only about as many references to him (1,451) as to Dewey. There must be a difference
more important than that between Dewey's clarity and benevolence and Heidegger's difficulty and imperiousness.
My knowledge of Dewey is very limited, but let  me venture this conjecture. Though striking parallels can be found
between Dewey's and Heidegger's views of technology and art, Dewey's important insights are submerged in a wealth of
observations that are interesting in their own right but tend to blur the contours of his critique of modern technology. Dewey's
flexible and variable discourse further disguises the identity and character of the phenomena that concern him. Heidegger
throughout his career was famously concerned to center his thinking in memorable sentences and words. Anyone familiar with
Heidegger can tell you on the spot that his discussion of technology pivots on the notion of the Gestell-the framework of
technology,  and that  his  vision of  a  better  world  revolves  about  the Geviert-the fourfold world of  centering things.  The
Deweyan counterparts to these points would have to be made much more discursively and with many qualifications.
But again, more than a difference of discourse is at issue here. Though Dewey's critique of philosophies is memorably
pointed and to the point, his critique of modern culture is much less so, and it is often hard to distinguish from mainstream
liberal thinking-in part, perhaps, because liberals have learned from Dewey. He is hardly more impressive when he talks about
what centers life and makes it worth living. Sometimes he (1958, p. 326) employs the entirely apt term "consummation" to
locate the telos of the good life. But he uses it in passing, and more often he (1988, pp. 19, 112, 145, 146, 147, 155, 183)
vaguely gestures at the ends of life via the cautious notion of "meaning."
I say all this knowing well that I have read but a small fraction of Dewey's writings. Whatever the shortcomings of the
preceding remarks, they can serve as a point of departure for further reflections on Hickman's book. Hickman clearly improves
on Dewey when it comes to terminological clarity and precision. He makes an interesting and original distinction between
technique and technology and never lets you forget what exactly he means by technology. In addition he ties the various
strands of Dewey's parlances tightly to his own terminology.
Clarity  and precision,  however,  come at  the  price  of  flattening  Dewey's  discussion of  technology.  I  do not  dispute
Hickman's formal definition (first presented on p. 12), nor would I deny that the definition captures Dewey's basic sense of
how we often do and always should appropriate the world about us. What gets effaced, however, in this wide conception of
technology, is Dewey's more specific use of "technology" and "technological" when he employs these vocables to capture and
criticize a cultural force-an approach that is much closer to, say, Langdon Winner's (1977, 1986) conception of technology as a
form of life than to Hickman's formal definition.
Hickman seems to endorse Winner's vision of technology in his introduction where he speaks of "technology as our
culture" (p. 3). Yet his formal definition implies at best a wide and uncritical outline of our culture. To be sure, determinism
and essentialism sometimes bedevil attempts at painting a vivid and critical picture of contemporary society. But Andrew
Feenberg (1991) has shown how we can have the best of two worlds-strong criticism and empirical adequacy.
Has Hickman unwittingly become hostage to his broad, if precisely worded, definition of technology? He is too vigorous
and trenchant a thinker to let that happen. The negative answer forces me, however, to acknowledge and explain the one
shortcoming I see in Hickman's position. He has refined and fortified his view of pragmatism to the point where he not only
makes it look impenetrable to criticism and unsurpassable to competing views, but where it also is in danger of losing its
purchase on the problems and possible improvements of the technological culture.
Not that Hickman is entirely uncritical of contemporary society. He rightly criticizes "straight-line instrumentalism" for its
heedlessness, and he joins in the standard liberal criticisms of the capitalist establishment (e.g., on pp. 33 and 159). But he pays
little attention to the particular cultural conditions of today and dismisses criticisms that do so. Thus he rejects the thesis that
the decline of traditional literacy and live performances and the rise of television and recorded music present a cultural and
broadly moral problem. He then considers a concession to the critics who subscribe to that thesis (I am one of them):
It might be objected that I have been unfair. Perhaps the view I am opposing asserts no more than that people
spend too much time going to the movies, watching television, listening to recorded music, and playing video
games-and not enough time reading books, writing essays, and making their own music (p. 120).
Television watching is of course the outstanding issue here, and its primary social consequence is in fact what may be
called its "displacement effect" (Borgmann, 1984, p. 141). It is a widely discussed and crucial issue of contemporary culture
(see Putnam, 2000; Kubey and Csikszentmihaly, 2002; and Winn, 2002.) But rather than joining the debate, Hickman redirects
the argument:
But the relative amount of time spent doing these things is not the central concern of the text-type determinists.
What alarms them is that people go to films or watch television or listen to recorded music at all (p. 120).
Even if someone were silly enough to hold this view, the way people spend their time is one of the telling phenomena of
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contemporary culture (see Robinson and Godbey, 1997). Hickman instead proposes an experimental approach to the uses of
media.  I  entirely agree on the need for  exploration and experiments.  But  should we not  first  consider the results  of  the
experiment our society has conducted with television for half a century now?
Redirection from important issues is  a move Hickman makes more than once. Consider his line of  argument in the
following:
That there is much that is dreary on television and on film and on audio recordings is beyond dispute. There is
also much that is dreary in print. That commercial television is used by some as a refuge from thought, only a
fool would wish to deny. But it is also beyond denial that there are books-even some written by philosophers-that
function in the same way (p. 122).
It is undeniable, to be sure. But bringing up this undeniable fact deflects us from the more interesting and troubling fact
that on average people in the United States spend about sixteen times as much time on watching television as they spend on
reading books (Robinson and Godbey, 1997, p. 323).
Hickman's pragmatic definition of technology is weak not only when it comes to the critique of contemporary culture, but
also as regards norms for reform. Max Horkheimer criticized Dewey on the latter point by accusing him, as Hickman puts it,
"of preoccupation with means at the expense of ends" (Hickman, 2001, p. 72). Here again Hickman redirects the argument
about the status of ends in social theory to the rejection of ends as metaphysical essences. Even if Horkheimer thought of ends
or norms in this way, the question whether social science can afford to neglect norms is still with us.
Hickman is concerned to establish the superiority of his pragmatic version of technology by showing that no one can
possibly have what he does not have-strong criticisms or strong norms. The rejection of firm norms, it must be stressed, is
more than an ad hoc move designed to make productive pragmatism triumph. It is an essential part of Hickman's version of
pragmatism. For Hickman "[n]either ends nor means are privileged" (p. 66). Our ideals or values call for continual "testing"
and "evaluation," they need to be "modified to accommodate the situation" that presents itself (p. 145). Here too, it seems to
me, Hickman has rendered Dewey's view more precise and narrower as well. Be that as it may, Hickman's position cannot be
right. If ends are as variable and adaptable as means, then the critics whom Hickman cites as complaining that productive
pragmatism "is too weak to provide adequate guidance for difficult decisions" are right (p. 47). In fact, absent firm values or
norms, there is no guidance at all.
To put the point differently, if values are testable, then there must be strategic or higher- order values that are firm and tell
us whether our tactical or first-order values that are being tested at the moment will serve as effective means for the strategic
ends. (This is an unresolved and longstanding issue between Hickman and me; see my 1992, pp. 345-347.) As an example of a
proper pragmatist, Hickman presents the social activist Randy Shaw who:
encouraged his clients to experiment with their cherished value of maintaining the status quo, namely, preventing
the hotel development that threatened their neighborhood. In other words, he encouraged his clients to treat their
goals as ends-in-view instead of intractable ideals (p. 145).
But surely he so encouraged them because greater flexibility would serve a higher goal-"to include a fragile segment of
the citizenry in the political process," as Hickman himself puts it (p. 144). Is this overarching goal also testable for Shaw?
Well, he might ask himself, Does that goal help me to make a name for myself? But then prestige or reputation is the still
higher strategic goal.
To be fair to Hickman, there is good sense in Dewey's notions of ends-in-view, in thinking of a goal as a hypothesis, and
in the recommendation to begin with the situation one is in and to adjust one's goal to the circumstances. But while Dewey's
flexibility and, perhaps, imprecision seem reasonable or at least acceptable, Hickman's radicalization of the issue achieves
clarity at the cost of normative aimlessness.
Invariably,  Hickman finds  at  the  core  of  strong criticisms or  proposals  the  ghosts  of  metaphysical  essences.  In  the
presently popular philosophical discourse, essentialism is meant to be the oppressive imposition of a particular view on the
diversity of the real  world.  "Metaphysical" essentialism makes the oppression worse by claiming timeless,  universal,  and
necessary status for the reigning view. Obviously the strict alternative to this position is the radically open and experimental
attitude  Hickman  has  so  vigorously  championed.  There  is,  however,  a  reasonable  third  possibility,  one  that  has  been
impressively set out by Charles Taylor (1992a, 1992b, 1994). He thinks that norms grow out of particular historical situations
and yet have a rightful claim on our allegiance.
The determinism Hickman so often detects in alleged essentialism or, more broadly, in strong criticisms of technological
phenomena is unobjectionable and empirically evident if we take a more subtle view of how people conduct and determine
their lives. There is in fact a kind of determinism when someone comes home from work, drained and tired, and drifts from
refrigerator via the microwave to the couch and the remote control and thus fails to cook a dinner, gather the family around the
table, and have the evening end with readings on all sides, interspersed with substantial conversation. The fulcrum of freedom
does not  lie on the threshold of  one's  home, but  rather  in  all  the fundamental  decisions we have made individually and
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collectively when we gave our world the shape it now has. What determinism there is at the surface is soft and defeasible as
exceptions to the typical behavior show. The issue is complex, to be sure, but it  is not featureless. It exhibits historically
evolved  patterns  that  are  subject  to  moral  analysis.  Such  historical  and  normative  sensitivity  is  needed  for  a  fruitful
conversation with Dewey. In a memorable passage, Hickman shows that the technological revolutions Dewey experienced as a
youth and a young man were so radical that subsequent technological developments look like mere refinements (pp. 44-45). A
new world took shape and was sorely tested by economic, social, and military crises. Dewey responded admirably as far as my
limited knowledge goes.
As Feenberg (see Feenberg, 1991) has pointed out, however, our situation is not Dewey's. It seems fashionable at the
moment to liken our time to the gilded age (Putnam, 2000, pp. 367-401; contrast with Hickman, 2001, pp. 83-84). But today
the democratic and technological  establishment is so much more solid,  entrenched, and of demonstrable adaptability and
resilience.  The  problems  of  the  technological  society  are  more  subtle  and  concealed  today,  setting  aside  the  widely
acknowledged and discussed issues of justice and the environment.
There appears to be little  historical  sensitivity in Hickman's  pragmatism. His definition of  technology-the invention,
development, and cognitive deployment of tools and other artifacts, brought to bear on raw materials and intermediate stock
parts,  with a  view to  the  resolution of  perceived problems-betrays  no particular  attunement  to  the  specific  ailments  and
possibilities of today's technology. The universal tenor of the definition is given an air  of necessity and supremacy most
emphatically in sections III-V of chapter nine where Hickman has the major twentieth century and contemporary philosophies
pass review only to find that none is equal to pragmatism. Feenberg is praised for coming closer to the pragmatic ideal, but
Feenberg's pleasure, understandably, is not entirely unalloyed. Walter Benjamin's "brilliant analyses" are acknowledged, yet
"his thesis remains thin, with little to say about the broader themes of reforming technological culture" (p. 167). Horkheimer is
pessimistic,  Marcuse  is  utopian,  there  are  "unresolved  splits"  in  Habermas's  thinking,  Winner's  approach  is  confined  to
"small-scale Jeffersonian-type efforts" (pp. 168 and 170). Even Feenberg (1991) finally falls short. His proposals:
are also planks in the Deweyan platform for the reconstruction of technological culture, but of course Dewey
succeeded in nailing them down long before the emergence of the critical theorists, to say nothing of Feenberg's
"updating" or reform of their positions (p. 178).
Having raised the stakes for a successful reform of technology throughout chapter nine by dispatching one competitor
after another, Hickman in chapter ten proposes to show how pragmatism will deal with "The Next Technological Revolution." I
think it is fair to say that the result is disappointing. We are once more told how not to proceed; we are given very broad
instrumental and procedural instructions; and we are reminded that the task is hard.
It is common among philosophers to bring one's position into relief against the supposed deficiencies of rival views. I
have certainly engaged in that practice. Hickman is more zealous than most in this regard though his fervor is largely redeemed
by his devotion to a great American thinker. Still  a little more pragmatism is perhaps called for, the kind of pragmatism
Andrew Light  and  Eric  Katz  (1996,  especially  pp.  1-18)  have  proposed  as  an  antidote  to  the  internecine  squabbles  in
environmental ethics. Such pragmatism would recognize that there has been something like specialization and a division of
labor among the philosophers who have met and worked with one another under the aegis of the Society for Philosophy and
Technology.
To illustrate the point, selectively and summarily, Hubert Dreyfus is the great critic of artificial intelligence and the most
important thinker on the place of practice in philosophy and culture. Paul Durbin (along with Carl Mitcham) has provided the
social  and scholarly basis  for  much of  our work,  and he has been foremost  in  exemplifying and calling for  the kind of
philosophy that  is  pragmatically  and practically engaged in  promoting social  justice.  Andrew Feenberg has  inherited  the
Frankfurt  School's  keen  sense  for  the  connection  between  culture  and  politics,  and  he  has  employed  it  in  his  original
description  of  secondary  instrumentation.  Larry  Hickman,  of  course,  has  given  our  work  an  impressive  and  indigenous
backdrop in Dewey's pragmatism. Don Ihde has done of postmodern diversity. Carl Mitcham, the cofounder and preeminent
historian of the field, has more than anyone ventured into the area of technology and religion and technology and ethics.
Langdon Winner, finally, is perhaps the most elegant and lucid critic and writer on "technology as a form of life," and he is
certainly the most widely known and influential philosopher among us. A new generation of scholars is coming up as I write.
Given such wide accomplishments, why has there not been a reform of technology? One of the great virtues of Hickman's
book is its persistent sense of urgency, well captured in the concluding words, "…talking about revolution is easy, but making
one is probably the most difficult and necessary task before us" (p. 184). What can the philosophers of technology contribute to
that task?
What Light and Katz have said about environmental ethics applies to our group of friends and colleagues too. Agreement
on a common definition, basic criticisms, and crucial reforms of technology would certainly strengthen the credibility of what
philosophers have to say about technology, and for better or worse ours is still the only coherent, if little-known and frequently
struggling, organization in this area.
But is it realistic at all to hope for a reform given the sometimes inertial and at other times irrational behavior of society?
SPT v7n1 - Kinds of Pragmatism http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/SPT/v7n1/borgmann.html
4 of 6 2/27/2014 3:01 PM
Have there been any social reforms apart from those that were driven by economics or politics? There have been two in the
latter half of the twentieth century-environmentalism and feminism. Neither was instigated by professional philosophers, but
both are often thought to have been launched by the critical and best-selling books of two thoughtful women-Rachel Carson's
Silent Spring (1962) and Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique (1963).
None of us has written or is likely to write such a signal book. Sometimes our group or one of us briefly rises to the
surface of publicity only to sink to all appearances without a trace. At other times the public mood is momentarily captured by
a movement such as technorealism, a take on technology that did not come from within our Society but did convey many of
our concerns. There are more distantly connected currents like Amitai Etzioni's communitarianism or Amartya Sen and Martha
Nussbaum's concern with the quality of life. But unlike the wildfires of the west, these smoldering concerns never break into
flame; far less do they grow and connect.
To be sure, we have done our writing and taught our students, and all that work has subtly and imperceptibly bled into the
culture at large. More important, we have thought through some of the difficult problems of technology. The fruits of our
labors are there to be used by anyone who is confused or troubled by the dark sides of technology or despairing and dispirited
about the prospects of contemporary culture. All that work can proceed more confidently thanks to Hickman's demonstration
that Dewey has broken a trail for us.
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